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PRO-ACTIVITY, PARTNERSHIP
AND PREVENTION:
THE UK CONTRIBUTION TO POLICING
ORGANISED CRIME IN EUROPE
Whatever the outcome of political initiatives within the European
Union (EU) and other European states regarding closer integration of
political and economic institutions, there has long been evident an
increasing integration and cooperation amongst the higher echelon of
criminals across the continent.1 Whether or not the EU expands its
membership, refines its constitution, harmonises the laws of Member
States or even disintegrates, law enforcement agencies across Europe
will continue to have to deal with the significant threat posed to
national and global infrastructures by the free market of organised
crime (Fiorentini & Peltzman, 1995; see also Williams, 1998: 265-8).
This market will feed off opportunities presented by the EU but will
also flourish in the absence of such a supranational entity. This paper
considers approaches that are being adopted within the UK to the
policing needs of Europe and possible responses to new demands with
particular reference to organised crime.
The Need for a UK Police Response
There are two drivers within the European context demanding a
response from UK police forces. The first is not new, but is gaining in
its significance. As long ago as the late 1960s Kent County Constabulary
recognised their need to address the localised transnational criminality
that focused on cross-Channel communications, and established the
force European Liaison Unit (ELU) to handle transnational enquiries
(Gallagher, 1998).2 Other forces have since established similar special-
ist units, for instance, Hampshire Constabulary's International Liaison
and Enquiry Team. Entirely within the remit of local UK forces,
although to some extent dependent upon geographical proximity to
Europe, there is an increasing need to be able to secure evidence
located abroad that relates to criminal investigations otherwise focused
within a single UK force area.
If this first is a bottom-up driver for police cooperation in reactive
investigations, then the second driver is assuredly top-down and pro-
active. Title VI of the Treaty of Amsterdam (TA) announces 'Provisions
on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters'. It lays the
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foundation for transferring some aspects of policing from the inter-
governmental cooperation sphere of the 'Third Pillar' to the EU
institutional framework of the 'First Pillar':
* . . the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high
level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by
developing common action among the Member States in the fields
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by prevent-
ing and combating racism and xenophobia. (Article 29, TA)
Europol, previously an organisation set apart from the EU, is now
incorporated as the mechanism by which cooperation is to be enhanced
and even directed (TA, Article 30(2)). The Presidency Conclusions of
the Tampere European Council3 reinforce the impetus of the TA by
calling for the 'joint mobilisation of police and judicial resources ... to
guarantee that there is no hiding place for criminals or the proceeds of
crime within the Union' (Presidency Conclusions, para. 6). Of par-
ticular concern to the EU is trafficking (in whatever commodity) and
financial fraud (see also Knudsen, 1998). Having taken 40 years to
establish a sophisticated, supranational economic infrastructure, the EU
is understandably concerned to protect it from levels of organised
criminality that cannot have been foreseen when the Treaty of Rome
was signed in 1957. The Presidency Conclusions call for efforts to
detect and dismantle criminal networks (para. 23), for action to prevent
organised crime at EU level (paras 41 and 42) and for a European
Police Chiefs Operational Taskforce 'to exchange, in cooperation with
Europol, experience, best practices and information on current trends in
cross-border crime and contribute to the planning of operative actions'
(para. 44). This level of response is largely beyond the remit of local
UK forces. The clear indication is that, through Europol, the EU will
seek UK cooperation in tackling aspects of organised crime that are
impacting on the EU.
In this respect of course, such criminality also impacts on the UK as
an EU Member State. It is inconceivable that criminals in a position to
exploit large-scale and profit-focused criminal opportunities across the
EU are not already honing their skills with criminal enterprises con-
ducted within individual Member States. There is considerable self-
interest for the UK in cooperating with the EU's new initiatives against
organised crime.4 For law enforcement agencies in the UK, 'partner-
ship' and 'prevention' are messages now broadcast in stereo by the EU
and the UK Government, and reinforced by the G8 countries (com-
muniqu6 from the G8 Ministerial Conference on Combating Trans-
national Organised Crime, Moscow, 19-20 October 1999; see also
Wrench, 1998).
UK Structures for Dealing with European Policing Issues
The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) provides a central
point of communication for enquiries outbound from the UK and
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incoming from foreign authorities. Both Europol and Interpol liaison
officers are collocated with NCIS. Although NCIS staff have no
investigative or prosecution functions per se, they are in a position to
facilitate enquiries and identify mutual intelligence interests. Investiga-
tions leading to prosecution remain the remit of enforcement agencies
such as the police, immigration and customs, all of which deal with
various forms of trafficking, and at least two of which potentially may
investigate aspects of fraud as well.
The National Crime Squad of England and Wales has a remit to
combat serious and organised, national and transnational crime that
impacts on the UK (s. 48 of the Police Act 1997; Home Secretary's
first objective, National Crime Squad Service Plan 1999/2000). Cross-
border issues in Scotland, with its unique jurisdiction within the UK,
are investigated by the Scottish Crime Squad. Each of these crime
squads is in a position to tackle police investigations arising from the
high-level organised criminality with which the EU is now concerned.
Whether there are sufficient resources yet available will largely depend
on how much work comes out of Europe via Europol, and to what
extent the work already being carried out by the two squads is seen to
be contributing to the EU initiatives.
At the level of transfrontier cooperation identified by Gallagher
(1998), local UK forces will continue to take the lead in police matters
as intervention at a national level would be inappropriate.
Proactive Investigation
It is difficult to treat as discrete entities proactivity, partnership and
prevention issues since there is considerable overlap between them.
The scale and sophistication of organised criminality is such that
proactive, rather than reactive, investigation is the only effective means
of detecting and disrupting such activity (Home Office, 1997: 7).
Enforcement violence utilised by criminal gangs may well result in
reactive murder investigations but such enquiries will address, within
this context, only peripheral criminality, not the profit-motivated, large-
scale activity that threatens national infrastructures. Such reactive
investigations fall within the remit of local UK forces at present, with
linked series being jointly investigated by local forces as the series
becomes apparent.
The UK must continue to maintain and develop mechanisms for the
proactive investigation of on-going organised criminality. Such mecha-
nisms include investigative organisations such as those referred to
above and legislative instruments such as the Police Act 1997 (Part III)
and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. For the organisa-
tions charged with such investigations, there is at issue their relation-
ship with the locally based policing of 150 years' tradition. In the light
of the threat posed, and the means available to deal with it, the role and
remit of national investigative agencies may have to be reviewed
in order better to address organised crime. Locally based policing,
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although it has a role in tackling organised crime as will be discussed
below, is not structured to combat transnational and global-scale
criminality. Indeed the principal legislative focus provided for UK
policing (Policing Act 1996, Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Local
Government Act 1999 and Scottish devolution) guides forces towards
local, community issues rather than the wider criminal perspective.
Not being in a position to combat transnational criminality, largely a
phenomenon of the last quarter century, is not a viable option for any
government.
Partnership
Partnership in the fight against organised crime exists at a number
of levels and the key to successful partnership working is to avoid
duplication. At the intergovernmental level the use of international
treaties, supported by appropriate Signatory State domestic legislation,
provides the strategic and political impetus. The mechanics of inter-
national mutual assistance within Europe are currently being updated
and negotiated in the form of a draft EU Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Nilsson, 1998). This treaty for EU
Member States is intended to supplement the (now somewhat outdated)
provisions of the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (European Treaty Series No. 30) and is open for
ratification to all Council of Europe Member States.
These treaties govern cooperation both at the level of individual
force enquiries and at the level of transnational organised crime invest-
igations. Because such instruments are written with this breadth of
provision, within these international treaty frameworks some enforce-
ment authorities have found it useful at the tactical level to have inter-
agency Memoranda of Understanding with their opposite numbers in
foreign states. The ELU, for instance, now have three such Memoranda
with various French and Dutch authorities and are seeking to enter into
another with Belgian authorities. HM Customs and Excise have a large
number of such memoranda with foreign customs agencies, mostly
under the auspices of the 1988 UN Vienna Convention on Drugs
(Harfield, 1999: 31).
At the operational level there is an increasing need for joint-agency
operations in the field of transnational organised crime. This is true
both between and within individual EU Member States. The draft
convention envisages international joint investigation teams to which
Europol will contribute intelligence and expertise. With the NCIS acting
as the strategic level contact for Europol within the UK for such opera-
tions, the National Crime Squad provides the investigative capability at
the tactical and operational levels for policing matters whilst the
National Investigation Service (HM Customs and Excise) provides a
similar capability in excise issues. Different agencies will have differ-
ent parts to play in each operation depending on the lines of invest-
igative attack to which any given criminal network will be vulnerable.
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Inadequate partnership working creates vulnerability in enforcement
measures that organised crime can exploit. Williams identifies the
essence of partnership working and consequences of it not working
properly.
The battle against criminal and trafficking organisations is . . . a
battle of unequals: it is a struggle between a government composed
of multiple organisations and constituencies, with diverse objectives
and interests, and an organisation with a single purpose or goal-
the maximisation of profits. ... Unfortunately, intelligence about
drug trafficking and other transnational crime is often jealously
guarded, bureaucratically compartmentalised and fragmented, and
disseminated without any clear sense of purpose or direction.
(Williams, 1998: 269)
Both within the UK and in other EU Member States it is the national
interests that matter rather than those of individual enforcement agen-
cies. Partnership in the pan-European fight against organised crime
lends itself readily to UK cross-cutting, best value political initiatives.
Prevention
Crime prevention has evolved in recent years from a level at which
older constables approaching retirement would spend their days
dispensing target-hardening and personal safety advice to anyone
who thought to ask for it, to the level of a science in which whole
estates (residential, commercial or industrial) are 'secured by design'
(www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crimprev/rbinit-4.htm) and comprehensive
community safety strategies are required by law (Crime and Disorder
Act 1998). Even so, it is difficult to equate strategies intended to reduce
attacks on persons or premises with what might be needed to tackle the
very different phenomenon of organised crime in which criminal
groups and networks operate as multinational businesses (Fiorentini &
Peltzman, 1995).
There are a number of issues that can be addressed when consider-
ing strategies for preventing national and transnational serious and
organised crime:6
* Cooperation between governments and enforcement agencies
" Strategic threat assessments
* Harmonisation of laws and operational practices
* Weaknesses of individual governments and enforcement agen-
cies
* Strength of criminal networks
* State-organised criminality
The first two points are addressed through proactive investigation and
formal instruments of cooperation and partnership as discussed above.
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To combat criminal organisations and networks that operate globally,
enforcement agencies from different nations have to cooperate and
work together. Different national jurisdictions have to be made to work
in unison. No one nation, let alone a single enforcement agency within
any given nation, can combat transnational organised crime single-
handedly. To cooperate effectively nations must have the internal
structures to address transnational policing issues, and in the UK the
NCIS, the National Crime Squad and the Scottish Crime Squad are best
placed to respond to policing initiatives and directives from Europol.
Another aspect of cooperation between governments and enforce-
ment agencies concerns strategic threat assessments: the means by
which the nature of the threat posed by organised crime can be
determined. Enforcement agencies provide operational intelligence
for intelligence agencies such as the NCIS to analyse. Such analysis
then informs the national contribution to the EU threat assessment
(Bruggeman, 1998: 85).
Harmonisation of laws does not necessarily mean the writing of a
single EU Criminal Code. It is about achieving common definitions,
common standards and common methodologies between different
national enforcement agencies (EU Action Plan, para. 6(b)). It could
include 'making it an offence under the laws of each Member State
for a person, present in its territory, to participate in a criminal
organisation, irrespective of the location in the Union where the
organisation is concentrated or is carrying out its criminal activity'
(Action Plan, para. 8(1)). But if this were not to be the case, then it is
about ensuring that such a lacuna does not inhibit enforcement and
judicial agencies. Achieving a consensus on what constitutes crime and
how laws can be enforced ensures that there will be no national havens
for criminals to seek refuge in (G8 Ministerial Communiqu6 on
Combating Transnational Organised Crime, October 1999, para. 17;
see also Williams 1998: 259 & 263). This is not radical. It is merely an
extension of the philosophies that underpin international extradition
law (Shaw, 1997: 482). Indeed, arguably the harmonisation of domestic
laws gives greater and more varied scope for investigation and prosecu-
tion than the establishment of a single EU criminal code and a single
EU prosecutor. The establishment of Eurojust, a judicial sister-body to
Europol, furthers this aim (Tampere Conclusions, para. 46). Such ideas
are already being debated of course, but specifically in relation to fraud
against the EU itself (House of Lords, 1999).
In 1994 the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
observed in a speech to the World Ministerial Conference on Organised
Transnational Crime in Naples that:
One of the best ways of preventing transnational crime is to
contribute to the development of countries experiencing economic
difficulties and to introduce transparency in their political and
social life.7
The Police Journal, Volume 73 (2000)
The fall of communism in Europe has been succeeded by a battle
for control of the post-communist economies between the fledgling
democracies and organised crime (Handelman, 1994). The history of
corruption and the black market in communist states has provided
fertile ground for criminal networks that seek to infiltrate or corrupt
government officials and law enforcement agents. Only by strengthen-
ing individual governments and enforcement agencies will their vulner-
ability to such attack be reduced. The National Crime Squad plays its
part in this aspect of organised crime prevention by promoting human
rights, accountability and agency integrity through twinning schemes
in which National Crime Squad personnel advise and train post-
communist enforcement agencies in investigative tactics and tech-
niques and anticorruption issues. Applicant states seeking membership
of the EU must reach accession criteria in law enforcement and judicial
matters as part of the EU drive to prevent organised crime finding new
avenues of access to criminal opportunities in the EU.8 Such twinning
schemes aim to assist developing nations to achieve the desired
standards.
The strength of any given criminal organisation or network is
derived from a number of factors:
* Access to illicit and legal markets to generate profit
* Personnel with varying skills or access to public authorities
" Capability to counter enforcement agencies either through
evasion or violence
* A context within which laws are weakly enforced
* Cooperation with other criminal groups
These factors are also, by definition, points of vulnerability at which to
attack organised crime. Any one agency will have varying capability to
impact on these different vulnerabilities. Illicit markets are generated
within the context of government regulation. To cite one very straight-
forward example, drugs are smuggled because they are illegal. Whilst
an investigative agency cannot determine government regulatory policy,
investigations have the potential to generate intelligence about the
manner in which criminal markets are shared between rival groups
(Polo, 1995). This in turn could influence decision-making when
drafting regulations to control activities and powers of enforcement.
Similarly, intelligence generated from investigations, if properly ana-
lysed, can contribute to a better understanding of how profits from
crime are then laundered through legitimate market places. Identifying
the links between illicit profits and legal markets will provide a better
means to regulate legal markets, thus reducing opportunities for laun-
dering (for estimates of the scale of illicit economies see House of
Commons, 1995: xii, xiii, xviii & xix; see also Celentani et al., 1995).
Investigation intelligence is analysed at different levels and for various
purposes by both the NCIS and the National Crime Squad.
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Regulatory regimes and controlled access to legal markets can be
circumvented through corrupt public officials. Various integrity meas-
ures can be taken to minimise the risk of placing individuals vulnerable
to corruption in sensitive posts. Again, intelligence arising from invest-
igations can and does highlight issues of corruption. It is at this level
that local forces potentially have a role to play. Community safety
strategies could be a vehicle by which issues of 'town hall' corruption
can be addressed. Laundering funds through local construction projects
or through betting shops are two of the options available to organised
crime groups and local police force support for local authority regula-
tion of such businesses can help reduce the vulnerability of such
businesses to attacks by organised crime.
Rigorous enforcement of laws does prevent offending and can
influence social attitudes. The significant reduction in Christmas drink-
driving arrests and convictions over the last decade demonstrates this
point. The converse is also true. A policy of cautioning persons for
personal possession of illicit drugs, or even of ignoring such an
offence, can lead to the wider public perception that such criminal
behaviour is, if not actually condoned, at least considered by the
authorities not to present a significant threat to society. Such a
perception misses the point that such apparently minor offences are the
culmination of a chain of organised criminality focusing on production,
importation and distribution networks sustained by crime and protected
by violence. Where regulations and laws are not strictly enforced, then
opportunities present themselves for organised crime groups either to
engage in primary criminality, or to launder illicit profits, without
challenge. Celentani et al. (1995) have interesting comments to make,
within the context of pure economic theory, about optimal levels of
regulation and tolerance within government authorities that allow
organised crime to make some profit but not too much. Such a Faustian
pact is unlikely ever to be politically acceptable in a corruption-free
administration. The part that investigative agencies can play in con-
tributing to this prevention strategy is obvious: detect criminals and
lock them up. But by learning from each investigation, analysing and
sharing the intelligence generated, the value of each individual opera-
tion goes beyond the detection and disruption of individual criminals
and their immediate networks. The information so gleaned becomes a
profit of enforcement' to re-invest in developing further prevention
and investigative strategies.
Using investigations to divide and rule criminal groups prevents
criminal cooperation. Cooperation within criminal groups, both vertic-
ally from 'god-father' to 'foot soldier' and horizontally between differ-
ent groups, is vulnerable to attack by enforcement agencies through
the use of informants, and by judicial bodies through sentences that
recognise cooperation with law enforcement. The opportunism, com-
petition and mistrust that exist within and between criminal networks
are resources for enforcement agencies to exploit. Using tactics to
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exploit these resources enables agencies to disrupt criminality and so
prevent and inhibit its effective operation.
The final element of organised crime for consideration with a view
to prevention is state-organised criminality (Chambliss, 1989; see also
Passa, 1993; Van Duyne, 1997). Whereas some states are vulnerable to
the strength of organised crime networks, others may choose actively to
cooperate with such networks (Williams, 1998: 268), perhaps as
indirect and covert means of prosecuting a foreign policy initiative to
disrupt or destabilise another state. Prevention at this level is largely the
prerogative of government intervention. Nevertheless, it will be for
enforcement agencies to work in partnership with governments to
detect and disrupt, and so prevent, the criminal activities of state-
sponsored networks. Europe may well find itself under attack from
criminal organisations based in, if not sponsored by, non-EU states
seeking to exploit from afar criminal opportunities presented by the
wealth of the EU and its budget. Bogus schemes set up within the EU
to attract subsidy in which the profits are diverted to organisations in a
non-EU state is but one example. The EU will look to its constituent
states and their enforcement agencies to tackle such criminality.
Conclusion
The EU must rely on its Member States because it has no enforcement
agency of its own. Europol and Eurojust are intended to improve and
facilitate cooperation between Member States for the common good
rather than assume enforcement responsibility through the EU. Issues
of sovereignty are closely linked to law enforcement. And with more
direction from Europe in the fight against organised crime come issues
of accountability to individual governments and citizens (McLaughlin,
1992; Walker, 1993).
The European Court of Justice, presently, cannot intervene in the
actions of Member State domestic enforcement agencies (TA, Article
35(5)). Nor would the current British Government, or many other EU
states, wish it to be able to. Some aspects of proactive investigation and
partnership working will remain intergovernmental but commentators
have argued that moving treaty-based cooperative measures, such as
Europol and the Schengen Information System, to the First Pillar of EU
business would render these structures more accountable to judicial
control (Hall, 1999), thereby instilling greater public confidence in
these mechanisms and so a greater willingness to assist rather than
resist these enforcement structures.
Structures for accountability are strong in the UK, particularly so
for those agencies that are involved in the national fight against
organised crime. The sorts of proactive techniques required to invest-
igate higher echelon criminality are subject to rigorous authority
regimes, including in some cases independent preview by judicial
commissioners (Part III of the Police Act 1997). Further regulation and
accountability for police actions is enshrined in the Regulation of
The Police Journal, Volume 73 (2000)
Investigatory Powers Act. Again, in some cases prior authorisation by
judicial commissioners is required before a tactic can be deployed. The
Human Rights Act 1998 gives effect to the European Convention on
Human Rights in UK courts. Police Authorities and, in the case of
the NCIS and National Crime Squad, Service Authorities provide a
structure for accountability to bodies that include elected councillors
and independent citizens (s. 3 of the Police Act 1996; ss 1 and 47 of the
Police Act 1997).
These safeguards ensure that, as an investigative agency, the
National Crime Squad is well positioned to address the three aspects of
policing organised crime that will increasingly be influenced by Europe
in the years ahead: proactive investigations, partnership working and
contributing to prevention strategies, all with the intention of combating
the threat posed by organised crime.
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End Notes
1. The Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime, Council of Europe 7421/97, ch. 1, and
Organised Crime, the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee, HC Session
1994-95, 18-I, outline the issues and the scale of the threat to the EU as a whole and
the UK in particular.
2. I am grateful to Dr Frank Gallagher not only for giving me a copy of this work but
also for discussing many of the issues in depth with me as I conducted my own
research.
3. Held on 15 and 16 October 1999. The text of the Conclusions (in English) is
available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm.
4. For the UK position on Justice and Home Affairs within the EU visit the Foreign and
Commonwealth website at http://l93.114.50.10/news/keythemepage.asp?89 where
the UK's commitment is outlined.
5. The Scottish Crime Squad is founded on the same basis as the former regional crime
squads in England and Wales prior to the statutory creation of the National Crime
Squad. It is thus not strictly equivalent in status to the National Crime Squad, being
rather one of the agencies with which the National Crime Squad is expected to work
under s. 48(3)(e) of the Police Act 1997. It remains to be seen how the new Drug
Enforcement Agency in Scotland impacts on the work of the Scottish Crime
Squad.
6. The National Crime Squad has a remit to 'prevent and detect serious crime which is
of relevance to more than one police area in England and Wales' and to 'act in
support of other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious
crime': Police Act 1997, ss 48(2) and 48(3)(e).
7. The full text of this speech is available at http://www.alternatives.com/crimel
ghali.html.
8. For the details of this see the Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime Between the
Member States of the European Union and the Applicant Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and Cyprus (98/C 220/01), which was adopted in 1998 under Title
VI of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1992).
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